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HE Survey period did not see any Texas Supreme Court cases in
the area of partnership law. There were, however, some interest-
ing, if not earthshattering, cases on the topic decided in the Texas
appeals courts and the lower federal courts. One case reiterates the rule
that for a partnership to be formed under Texas law, there must be an
agreement to share profits. There were also two cases relating to the ef-
fect on the existence and validity of a limited partnership of a failure or
delay in filing a certificate of limited partnership under Texas law. Still
other cases focused on the liability of partners, one in the general part-
nership context, and the other in the limited partnership context.
II. CASES
A. FORMATION-REGARDLESS OF How PARTIES CHARACTERIZE
THEIR BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, THERE IS NO PARTNERSHIP IF THERE
IS NO AGREEMENT TO SHARE PROFITS AND LOSSES-VALERO ENERGY
CORP. v. TECO PIPELINE CO.1
In Valero, a Texas court of appeals held that conclusory testimony and
documents regarding the existence of a partnership, separate from the
operation of an operating agreement between co-owners of a natural gas
pipeline, was not sufficient to establish that a separate partnership ex-
isted. In Valero, there was no evidence that the co-owners had agreed to
share profits and losses, other than in the operating agreement itself.2
Through a series of mergers and other transactions, Valero Energy Cor-
poration and Teco Pipeline Company reluctantly became joint owners of
the TransTexas Pipeline. 3 As part of the overall ownership structure,
Teco and Valero were parties to (i) an Operating Agreement, which cre-
ated a joint venture to operate and manage the pipeline, (ii) an Owner-
ship Agreement, which defined their respective ownership interests, and
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.A., Trinity University; J.D., University of Iowa. Attorney at Law, Haynes and
Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
1. 2 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
2. Id. at 586.
3. Id at 580.
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(iii) a Transportation Agreement. 4 A dispute arose almost immediately,
and Teco sued Valero for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, tortious inter-
ference and professional malpractice. 5 Valero moved to stay the litiga-
tion on the ground that the Operating Agreement provided that all
disputes be resolved exclusively by arbitration.6 Teco argued that the dis-
pute was not subject to the arbitration clause of the Operating Agree-
ment because the dispute was based on a partnership separate from the
joint venture established by the Operating Agreement. 7
On interlocutory appeal, the appeals court considered whether a sepa-
rate partnership was formed between Valero and Teco when Teco became
an owner in the pipeline. The court first stated the general rule with re-
spect to the formation of a partnership: "An express or implied partner-
ship agreement has four essential elements: (1) a community of interest in
the venture, (2) an agreement to share profits, (3) an agreement to share
losses, and (4) a mutual right of control or management of the enter-
prise .... As a matter of law, a partnership does not exist if any one of
these elements is not established."8
The court examined Teco's evidence supporting its argument that a
separate, unwritten partnership agreement was created by its investment
in the pipeline. The court found that while the president of Teco testified
that he believed that a partnership existed, he did not testify to any facts
to support his conclusion. 9 Teco also presented several documents in-
tended to demonstrate a separate partnership in which Valero referred to
the joint ownership in the pipeline as a partnership, including Valero
management committee meeting minutes that reflected that Valero had
considered, but tabled the idea of drafting a partnership agreement be-
tween Valero and Teco.10
The court found that there was no evidence of an agreement to share
profits or to share losses." The fact that Teco's president believed that
Teco and Valero were to divide revenues and expenses in accordance with
the Operating Agreement was evidence that the relationship between the
two companies was based on the Operating Agreement and not a sepa-
rate partnership.12 Furthermore, the court found that the documents
were not determinative because, "A representation contained in a docu-
ment or made to a third party that a partnership relationship exists con-
stitutes a legal conclusion and is not determinative of the relationship. '13
Without evidence of a separate profit and loss agreement, Teco could not
4. Id.
5. Id. at 581.
6. Valero, 2 S.W.3d at 581.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 584-85.
9. Id. at 586.
10. Id. at 585-86.





prevail in its argument that a separate partnership existed.' 4
This may be a fact and industry-specific result. The oil and gas area has
long seen these operating agreements with the parties opting out of fed-
eral partnership tax treatment. Had there been no operating agreement,
it is entirely possible that the facts offered to support a partnership would
have been found sufficient by a court.
B. FORMATION-A TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IS VALID IF
FORMED IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE TEXAS REVISED
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT-CHURCH V. U.S.
1 5
In Church, the federal district court found that a Texas limited partner-
ship had been validly formed as of the date of death of one of the limited
partners, even though at the time of the limited partner's death the lim-
ited partnership certificate had not yet been filed, and the general partner
was not created until months after the limited partner's death.16 Ms.
Church and two of her children, Mr. Miller and Ms. Newton, each owned
undivided interests in ranch land in West Texas. In 1993 they decided to
form a limited partnership to manage and operate the ranch.17 On Octo-
ber 22, 1993, Ms. Church, Mr. Miller and Ms. Newton executed a limited
partnership agreement and special warranty deeds conveying their inter-
ests in the ranch to the limited partnership. 18 A limited liability com-
pany' 9 to be owned by Mr. Miller, and Ms. Newton was intended to be
the general partner of the limited partnership. Mr. Miller executed the
partnership agreement and a limited partnership certificate on behalf of
the general partner.20
Two days later, on October 24, 1993, Ms. Church unexpectedly died.21
As of the date of her death, the general partner had not yet been formed
and the certificate of limited partnership had not been filed with the
Texas Secretary of State.22 The certificate of limited partnership was filed
on October 26, 1993.23 The general partner was eventually formed in
March 1994.24
After the estate of Ms. Church filed her estate tax return and payment
with the internal revenue service, the IRS sent a notice to the estate that
it intended to assess a deficiency against the estate, arguing that the lim-
14. Id. The court stated, "Accordingly, we find no evidence of any partnership sepa-
rate from the joint venture established under the terms of the Operating Agreement." Id.
15. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2000)
16. Id at *17.
17. Id. at *2.
18. Id. at *4, *5.
19. The court's opinion refers to the general partner entity as a corporation, but based
on its name "Stumberg Ranch, L.C.," it appears to be a limited liability company. This
article will refer to the general partner as a limited liability company. Id. at *4.
20. Church, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 at *5.
21. Id. at *6
22. Id.
23. Id. at *7.
24. Id. at *8.
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ited partnership was never properly formed and, therefore, the valuation
given by the estate of assets related to the ranch was too low. 25 Ms.
Church's estate filed a lawsuit in federal district court against the IRS
seeking, among other things, a decision that the limited partnership was
formed and in existence as of the date of Ms. Church's death.26 The dis-
trict court found that the formation of the limited partnership was in
"substantial compliance in good faith" 27 with the Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act 28 and, the limited partnership was "a valid Texas limited
partnership" as of the date of Ms. Church's death.2 9
This appears to be very much a result-oriented decision that easily
could have gone the other way. The statutory test of "substantial compli-
ance with the requirements for filing a certificate" 30 is, as this decision
clearly demonstrates, subjective. If the issue in the case had been liability
to a third party who was unaware of the existence of a limited partner-
ship, perhaps the result would have been different. Here, it appears that
the court concluded that the parties were caught by Ms. Church's sudden
death and that they did not "deserve" to be penalized for that. That they
had begun the process by executing a limited partnership agreement and
special warranty deeds demonstrated their intent (to the court's
satisfaction).
C. PARTNER LIABILITY-A GENERAL PARTNER'S LIABILITY FOR
PARTNERSHIP DEBT IS NOT PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LAW-REMINGTON V. U.S.31
In Remington, the federal court of appeals held that the internal reve-
nue code does not preempt the Texas state partnership law principle that
partners in a general partnership are jointly and severally liable for all
debts and obligations of the partnership. 32 Mr. Remington was a partner
in a law firm that was organized as a general partnership under Texas
25. Church, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 at *15.
26. Id. at *1.
27. Id. at *17.
28. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, §1 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 2000).
29. Church, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 at *17. The court does not elaborate on its
reasoning for this finding but does refer to "the reasons stated in its order on the Govern-
ment's motion in limine (docket no. 44)..." Id.
Also, the court in an unpublished opinion in the case of Isaminger v. Gibbs, No. 05-99-
00978-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4525 (Tex. App. - Dallas July 7, 2000, no pet. h.) (not
designated for publication), held similarly. In that case, the appeals court upheld a trial
court finding that a Texas limited partnership was validly created even though a limited
partnership certificate was never filed with the Texas Secretary of State. Id. at *7-8. In
that case, the court relied on Section 2.01(b) of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act
in holding that a limited partnership is formed "when there has been substantial compli-
ance with the requirements for filing a certificate." Id. at *9. The court went on to find
that because the partners had done everything except file the certificate, they substantially
complied with the statutory requirements and, therefore, the limited partnership had been
validly formed. Id. at *10.
30. See note 29 and accompanying text.
31. 210 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2000).
32. Id. at 283.
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law. 33 In 1986, he discovered that the firm had failed to prepare and file
certain federal employment tax returns.34 He supervised the preparation
of the returns by a certified public accountant and submitted them to the
Internal Revenue Service.35 The IRS then assessed the taxes and filed
liens against partnership property and against the property of Mr. Rem-
ington as a general partner of the partnership. 36 When the IRS at-
tempted to satisfy the debt by levying against Mr. Remington's property,
he filed suit in Federal district court for wrongful levy.37 After the district
court denied Mr. Remington's claim, he filed an appeal with the Fifth
Circuit, arguing that the IRS cannot proceed against a general partner of
a partnership to collect taxes owed by the partnership. 38
The court rejected Mr. Remington's claim that federal tax law, which
provides that the IRS may impose penalties against a responsible person
who failed to collect and remit employment taxes, preempts the state law
rule that partners in a general partnership are jointly and severally liable
for the debts of the partnership. 39 The court held that the internal reve-
nue code provisions relating to the assessment and collection of penalties
for an employer's failure to withhold and remit employment taxes apply
to all types of business organizations, and in the case of partnerships, cre-
ate an additional or supplemental source of liability, not a preemptive
one.
40
The only comment the authors can think to offer here is "nice try."
The results seem straightforward and required by established partnership
law principles.
D. PARTNER LIABILITY-A GENERAL PARTNER IN A LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP CANNOT RELY ON AN INDEMNITY TO RELEASE IT FROM
LIABILITY TO LIMITED PARTNERS WHO HAVE PAID DEBTS OF THE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP- WALLERSTEIN V. SPIR741
In Wallerstein, a Texas court of appeals held that a general partner
could be held liable for the indemnity obligation of a limited partnership
to certain of its limited partners even though the limited partnership
agreement stated that only the partnership, and no partners individually,
would be responsible for that indemnity. Mr. Wallerstein was the general
partner in a limited partnership that defaulted under a loan agreement. 42
After default, the lender recovered the debt from the guarantors of the
loan, who were limited partners in the partnership. 43 The limited partner
33. Id. at 282.
34. Id.
35. Id.





41. 8 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. App. - Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
42. Id. at 776.
43. Id. at 778.
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guarantors successfully sued the partnership for indemnification of the
amounts they paid under the guarantees. 44 The limited partners then
sued Mr. Wallerstein, as general partner, to collect the judgment against
the partnership. 45
Mr. Wallerstein argued that the limited partnership agreement provi-
sion relating to the liability of the partners released him from liability to
the limited partners. 46 The court held that Mr. Wallerstein's argument
confused the idea of indemnity with the idea of release.47 Because the
court held that the partnership language cited by Mr. Wallerstein was
clearly an indemnity rather than a release, Wallerstein was not released
from any liability he might have to the limited partners. 48
Mr. Wallerstein also argued that he should not be personally liable for
the debts of the partnership because the partnership agreement stated
that the partners are not liable to one another for indemnity. It stated
only the partnership is required to indemnify partners.49 The court dis-
agreed, holding that the limited partners already had won indemnifica-
tion against the partnership and were merely seeking to collect the
judgment against the partnership from Wallerstein as the general partner
of the partnership.50 The court's finding centered on the fact that the
limited partners were not acting in their capacity as limited partners in
the partnership but as third party creditors against the partnership. 51
The pertinent language from the Partnership Agreement bears quoting
in full (with the emphasis given by the court in its opinion):
Liabilities of the Partners. All obligations, expenses and losses in-
curred, and all payments made by the Partners in connection with
the Partnership and the Property from and after the date hereof, in-
cluding without limitation, payments due on mortgages and other in-
debtedness incurred in connection with the Property, and any
liability for damages arising out of claims or actions against any of
the Partners on account of ownership of the Property, shall be obli-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 778.
46. Wallerstein, 8 S.W.3d at 779. The limited partnership agreement provided: "No
Limited Partner shall have any personal liability for the payment of Partnership Obliga-
tions. The Partnership (but not the Partners individually) shall indemnify and hold each
Partner harmless in respect of all payments reasonably made and personal liabilities rea-
sonably incurred by each Partner in the ordinary and proper conduct of the Partnership's
business..." Id.
47. Id. The court stated that, "Unlike a release, which suppresses a cause of action, an
indemnity creates a potential cause of action between the indemnitee and the indemnitor."
Id.
48. Id. at 780.
49. Id.
50. Id. In support of this holding, the court cited Section 4.03 of the Texas Revised
Limited Partnership Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 4.03(b) (Vernon Supp.
2000), which provides that "Except as provided by this Act, a general partner of a limited
partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners to per-
sons other than the partnership and the other partners." But the court also acknowledged
that the agreement of the parties could override this (Id. at 778), which was the main issue
here-did it so override.
51. Wallerstein, 8 S.W.3d at 780.
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gations of the Partnership if made or incurred in accordance with the
terms hereof (such obligations are hereinafter referred to as "Part-
nership Obligations"). No limited Partner shall have any personal lia-
bility for the payment of Partnership Obligations. The Partnership
(but not the Partners individually) shall indemnify and hold each Part-
ner harmless in respect of all payments reasonably made and per-
sonal liabilities reasonably incurred by each Partner in the ordinary
and proper conduct of the Partnership's business or for the preserva-
tion of its business or property.52
The Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act allows the partners to pro-
vide, in their partnership agreement, that a general partner is not liable
for debts owed by the partnership to the partners, as opposed to third
party creditors. 53 There is a plausible argument that the parenthetical in
the second italicized sentence above expressed the agreement of the part-
ners that partnership assets, alone, would stand behind obligations of the
partnership, at least with respect to debts owed to the partners (as op-
posed to true third party creditors). It appears that when the court read
the second italicized sentence with the first, which states that only the
limited partners are released from liability for partnership obligations,54 it
decided that the language simply was not precise enough for the court to
conclude, as a matter of law, that the partners intended to release the
general partner from liability for debts owed by the partnership to the
limited partners. It would have been less surprising if the court had de-
clined to find this in a summary judgment context, and the court certainly
could have found in favor of the general partner under the reported facts
and circumstances.
52. Id. at 779.
53. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 4.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000) provides
that "Except as provided by this Act, a general partner of a limited partnership has the
liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners to persons other than the
partnership and the other partners. Except as provided by this Act or in the partnership
agreement, a general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a
partnership without limited partners to the partnership and the other partners." (emphasis
added).
54. Note that in the quoted language above "Partnership Obligations" is fully defined,
and includes payments made on mortgage obligations of the partnership. Ironically, the
provision states that the limited partners are not personally liable for these obligations;
but, they signed separate contracts-guaranties-under which they took on personal liabil-
ity for which they sought reimbursement here.
2001] 1553
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